The  Barometer / v.15-1 by Branco, R.J. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Institutional Publications Naval Postgraduate School Barometer
1974-01-14
The Barometer / v.15-1
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50297
VOL. XV, NO.1 14 JANUARY 1974 
EDITORS: 
LCDR R. J. BRANCO, SMC #1585 
LT L W HUfAT 5MG fl?g? 
The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
*+*+*+*+*+*+*+* 
"In American eyes, some of our allies - whom American troops in 
Europe, still 300,000 strong, have been helping to protect for 
these past 23 years - ran out on us when the chips were down, 
cravenly caving in to Arab oil pressure and obstructing our 
efforts to resupply Israel at the crucial moment; on top of that, 
our NATO partners had the gall to complain when we put our own 
troops on alert to counter a Soviet threat to send their troops 
into the Middle East •.•• Is the Western alliance worth the 
infinite patience required to maintain it, in the light of ahe t.- :, 
way the European members flunked the solidarity test last ~?;e 
The answer is yes. Pandering to greed, suffering, foolishnes~ __ 
and swallowing ingratitude is part of the price Americans mu~r-; ~ -
pay in order to lead - and occasionally to manipulate - the ~~jey~ 
agglomeration of mainly free people who make up the Atlantic faa\l)..arr€e." 
.t:>-
William Safire, "NATO After The War", MONTEREY PENINSULA HE~ 
November 29, 1973. ------
EDITORIAL COMMENT: This first BAROMETER feature for 1974 might appear to express unrealistic 
views in view of our current military personnel problems. However, the redeeming factor of 
this article by Henry H. Beam is that it reminds uS of the periodic need to review tradition-
al views and policies in order to meet the challenge of the dynamic nature of modern times. 
FEATURE: NEEDED: NEW PERSONNEL POLICIES FOR THE MILITARY 
"The 1970's are developing as the decade of people, just as the 1960's developed as the 
decade of technology, culminating in 1969 with man first setting foot on the moon. The 
military man-both officer and enlisted-is being increasingly perceived as a human resource 
and not merely as an adjunct to a weapon system. Recent findings in the behavioral sciences 
raise questions about the ability of traditional military personnel policies to provide for 
future manpower needs in an all-volunteer Force society. 
My thesis is that we must restructure personnel policies of the military at the highest 
governmental levels if we hope to attract and retain the able young men we need for the 
high quality military we must have in the decades ahead. We have ended the draft, but the 
Armed Forces are not getting the quantity or quality of new men they desire. The problem 
does not lie in a lack of effort to recruit. Rather, it lies in the continuation of policies 
that are no longer relevant. 
In the last decade the Armed Services have increasingly recognized that men are 
individuals with unique feelings and aspirations and expect to be treated as such. For 
example, in his three years as Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Zumwalt has taken great 
strides toward improving the hygienic factors in the Navy. But as we know from past 
research studies, providing a good set of hygienic factors is not the same as providing 
motivation. Increased pay, improved living conditions ashore and afloat, and reduction of 
anachronistic military practices have all been highly desirable innovations in recent years, 
but they are hygienic factors at heart. The remove inequities, but that is not the same 
thing as providing motivation. 
We need to go beyond the level of hygienic factors if we are going to attract and 
retain the caliber of person we want in the Armed Forces in the 1970's. We need new 
concepts for personnel policies in all branches of the service. But we must not confuse 
improving hygienic factors with creating an environment in which our military personnel can 
find satisfaction in their work. We must provide opportunities for our service men to find 
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self-actualization through their work that is intrinsically meaningful to them. Our task 
is to find the proper balance between serving the needs of the individual members of the 
military community and meeting the requirements of the military profession. Let us look 
at some of the specific measures we can take to build a foundation for modern personnel 
policies which will meet these twin objectives. 
DO AWAY WITH THE 20 YEAR CAREER 
The first place to start in restructuring military personnel policies is to do away with 
the concept of the twenty year career. What is so magical or desirable about twenty years? 
There is no need to set such an exact demarcation to mark the completion of a career and 
the beginning of retirement. For example, consider why one nuclear trained submarine 
officer who had spent nine years on active duty left the Navy to work for IBM: "I had 
spent nine years at sea and could look forward to more sea duty in the near future. I 
could also look forward to command of a nuclear submarine. But after my command (at about 
16 years of service), where would I go? To a staff someplace, I suppose. To me, there is 
more to life than spending all that time (20 years) just for one command." 
The Navy, for example, has many highly talented former commanding officers now serving 
on staffs and other support billets. Most of these men are now Lieutenant Commanders and 
Commanders who have no chance of getting another command in grade and little chance of getting 
a command if they are promoted. What do they have to look forward to? More staff duty 
until they can complete their twenty! These men sit on an artificially constructed 
plateau. Their careers have resembled climbing a mountain. The primary objective is reached 
in the middle-gaining the pinnacle-and not at the end, as in most endeavors in life. There 
are similar examples with pilots in the Air Force and troop commanders in the Army. \\Tby 
not give these men the option to retire immediately after their command tour and start their 
second (civilian) career in their late thirties rather than wait until their early forties? 
Indeed, why not do away with the concept of the twenty year career altogether? \fhy not 
tie the service man's retirement to a percentage of the amount of time he has served after 
a certain minimum qualifying period? Why not grant him partial vesting in his pension 
rights after five years of service, for example. There would be many advantages to this: 
'Men could leave active duty after serving in certain "pinnacle" jobs, such as commanding 
officer of a ship, project manager, or senior or Master Chief Petty Officer or Sergeant. 
'The tendency to overload staffs with senior officers waiting out their time to retire-
ment would be greatly reduced. 
'A cadre of highly qualified personnel would still exist in the civilian work force 
which could be called upon in the event of national emergency. 
'In the enlisted ranks, the tendency to accumulate too many senior ratings and too few 
intermediate ratings would be reduced. 
We are already seeing efforts in this direction, such as Proposed New Military Non-
disability Retirement System. This proposal is being distributed to all members of the 
active duty forces at the present time. This new plan would provide benefits for both 
voluntary and involuntary separations. For example, a person separated voluntarily with 
ten or more years of service, but less than twenty, would receive a monthly pension at 
age sixty equal to two and one half percent of his last year's pay times his years of active 
service. However, at this writing, this is merely a proposal and does not have the force 
of law, although it is being strongly backed by the Department of Defense. It is a step 
in the right direction, but it stops well short of the proposals made here. 
DO AWAY WITH THE ENLISTMENT CONTRACT 
The second major personnel concepts that needs revision is the "enlistment contract" 
of the enlisted man. Why not let enlisted personnel serve in the same fashion that Regular 
officers do-under an arrangement whereby they remain on active duty until they request 
termination. The current enlistment contract is designed to reduce uncertainty about the 
future availability of military manpower. It assumes that the enlisted man must be legally 
bound to serve, or else his natural aversion to work will cause him to leave the service 
as soon as he is faced with a task he doesn't like. 
But all people do not do their best under such circumstances. This is especially true 
in the highly technical ratings (e.g., electronics technician) which are becoming more 
prevalent as the sophistication of our weapons systems continues to increase. These are 
also the areas where we currently have our greatest manpower shortages. The assumptions 
that man likes to work, that he is creative and capable of se1f-direction-are much more 
descriptive of the type of enlisted man we want in the Armed Forces in the 1970's. Doing 
away with the enlistment contract would make it much more likely that the enlisted man 
would find the military a favorable environment in which to work. 
This also ties in directly with the concepts of a career of less than 20 years, and 
the reality of an all-volunteer Armed Force. Let the man stay in the Navy until he dec~des 
he wants to leave. Place the emphasis on offering him an opportunity rather than offer~ng 
him a career. This challenges military leadership at all levels to make the mil~tary way 
of life attractive enough to the talented young petty officer or non-com so he w~ll want to 
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stay on active duty rather than return to civilian life and the vagaries of the civilian 
job market. 
CONSIDER THE RESERVES A TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCE 
The reserve components of the military should be considered primarily a technological 
resource and not a potential supplement to the operating forces. The growing similarity 
of jobs in the military and in civilian life has caused the military man to develop more 
of the skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders. 
The narrowing difference in skill between military and civilian society is an outgrowth of 
the increasing concetration of technical specialists in the Armed Forces. For example, 
the allowance lists for our new nuclear submarines and guided missile destroyers have 
fewer than five percent of their enlisted billets allocated to non-rated men. Overall 
only one man in five in the military now performs a purely military related skill with~ut 
a close equivalent in civilian life. 
Personnel policies in the Reserve components should reflect this fact. They should 
be oriented toward providing a pool of highly trained technical and administrative personnel 
who can be integrated into similar jobs in the actives forces both in time of emergency and 
during periods of active duty for training. We should explicity recognize that a large 
portion of Reservists, both officer and enlisted, attend college after their release from 
active duty. These men constitute a valuable technological resource. It makes sense to 
encourage these men to develop their technical and administrative skills-perhaps through 
giving Reserve drill credit for attending selected college courses-rather than insisting 
they be trained to augment the crew of an operating ship or a field battalion if called back 
to active duty. REVISE PERSONNEL POLICIES 
The reality of the all-volunteer Armed Force has brought to light the difficulties 
encountered by following the traditional recruitment and selection policies of the military. 
We must insure the military has a wide enough pool of applicants so it can concentrate on 
selecting the right men rather than simply getting enough men. 
We need to revise traditional military personnel policies at the highest levels so that 
we can create the environment in which the men we want manning our ships, planes, and 
battalions in the 1970's will indeed be the men we get in the military in the 1970's. The 
recent transition to an all-volunteer Armed Force has generated uncomfortable pressures to 
meet recruiting quotas without the draft. Yet these pressures are beneficial in that they 
have forced us to rethink our traditional techniques of selection, enlistment, advancement, 
and retirement. In the future, we must move towards understanding the military man as a 
human resource and away from considering his as an adjunct to a piece of machinery. In 
recent years we have vastly improved the hygienic factors of military life. This is within 
the power of the military heads of each of the services, and they are to be commended for 
what they have done. But now it is time for their civilian superiors in the Department of 
Defense and the members of Congress to modernize the basic structure of the military's 
personnel policies so they will be suited to the tasks of recruiting and retention that 
lie ahead. Only with modern personnel policies based on an understanding of the needs of 
the individual can we expect to have a military that will be properly motivated to do all 
that we will demand of it in the 1970's." 
(Reprinted with the permission of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, December 1973) 
FEATURE: "FILL 'ER up" 
"Every month it seems that the reserve fleet, or the scrap metal heap, claims a few 
more vintage ships. The once thick register of active Navy ships grows thinner all the time. 
As Service Force ships such as fleet oilers, tugs, and salvage ships, become fewer, the Navy 
looks more and more to Military Sealift Command to perform underway replenishments of Navy 
combatant ships. MSC is changing also. As worldwide military sealift requirements decline, 
the command's fleet support missions have expanded. 
Last August marked the first time in recent years a Seventh Fleet amphibious ship 
refueled from a civilian-owned tanker. The USS BLUE RIDGE, an amphibious command and 
control ship, took on some 158,000 gallons of Navy distillate fuel from the Falcon Princess, 
a commercial ship under charter to Military Sealift Command. 
MSC ships refueling Navy combatants is not a new idea. USNS TALUGA, operating with the 
Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, has performed 300-plus underway replenishments or 
unreps in the past year. However, TALUGA is government owned and is operated by MSC civilian 
employees. Falcon Princess is chartered and crewed by men who haven't been specifically 
trained to perform unreps with Navy ships as TALUGA's Civil Service crewmen have. 
The underway replenishments are all part of an on-going program being conducted by 
Navy to develop greater capability in use of MSC and chartered tankers in support of fleet 
operations. The program is known as Charger Log. 
In early October, USNS SAUGATUCK supplied the USS CALOOSAHATCHEE with 50,000 barrels of 
Nayy distillate. Beginning in foggy weather, the unrep in the Atlantic was successful in 
all respects. 
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"Using available resources is what it's all about," said Rear Adm. John D. Chase, 
commander of Military Sealift Command. Admiral Chase pointed out that lower cost, typified 
by man hours expended, is a major benefit in employing a commercial tanker. It takes only 
24 men to keep the Falcon Princess at sea for extended periods of time. To keep a fleet 
oiler out for the same length of time constantly servicing fleet units would require 
hundreds of men since combatant ships are manned to meet combat needs. 
"Limited the need to withdraw Navy oilers from normal fleet operating areas is one of 
the reasons for using commercial tankers," he said. Admiral Chase cabled Falcon Tankers 
Inc. to laud the Falcon Princess' "professionalism" in helping make the operation a 
complete success. 
Another unrep by a chartered commercial tanker in the Pacific is planned in the near 
future, and two more unreps by MSC-owned tankers currently are scheduled in the Atlantic. 
An example of the effectiveness of the program is the fact that two more fleet oilers 
have been turned over by the Navy to Military Sealift Command for manning by Civil 
Service mariners. 
The two ships, PASSUMPSIC and MARIAS, now are undergoing overhauls to ready them for 
the their fleet support role. PASSUMPSIC is due to being operating with the Seventh Fleet 
in the Western Pacific around January, 1974 and MARIAS will sail to join the Sixth Fleet 
in the Mediterranean the following March. 
Use of both merchant and MSC-manned, ex-Navy ships to support and supply Navy fleet 
ships has been enthusiastically supported by Admiral Zumwalt and by Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Maritime Affairs, Robert J. Blackwell. Success of a substantial number of 
refuelings-and at least one vertical replenishment involving a Navy stores ship and a 
commercial barge carrier-clearly indicate that the Charger Log program is an effective 
means of integrating resources of both the U.S. Navy and the merchant marine." 
(Reprinted version of Howard Rosenberg's article which appeared in the November, 1973 
issue of SEALIFT magazine). 
SERVICE . NOTES 
ICELAND VULNERABILITY CITED AT NATO MEETING 
"Brussels-Warning that Soviets are attempting to "lure" Iceland into a "state of semi-
liberalization or even neutrality" was circulated at the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion defense ministers meeting this month, in an attempt to convince the island nation 
to stay firmly in the NATO ranks with a continued U.S. presence there. 
Icelandic rejection of U.S. forces stationed there could outflank Europe on the 
north, and, in the event of future tensions, could provide great temptation for Russia to 
occupy the country. 
The warning was a reaction to recent exploitation of the fishing dispute between Iceland 
and the United Kingdom, two NATO nations, and of increasing resentment in Iceland over the 
presence of several thousand U.S. troops stationed there since the end of World War 2. 
The Soviets have sent a number of trade delegations to Iceland in recent months, have 
signed a commercial agreement with the country, and have agitated, privately, against its 
NATO role. The NATO document containing the warning said that the current deployments not 
only protect Iceland itself but serve as a logistics and communication link for the 
defense of Western Europe. 
"The loss of such facilities would result in a large gap in intelligence of Soviet 
maritime actions and degrade NATO's capability for providing quickly and safely reinforce-
ments to Norway and other areas of the northern region and the support of such reinforcements 
by both sea and air," the document said. 
It continued by saying that loss of facilities in Iceland would "also degrade NATO's 
capability to provide air cover to the alliance's naval forces operating in the North 
Atlantic. In addition, the loss of large fuel installations and communications facilities 
would have a detrimental effect on NATO's defense plans." 
The defense ministers said that even if Iceland were to agree to permit re-occupation 
by NATO forces in an emergency, the time lag involved would be too great to prevent Soviet 
occupation of the island because of the large deployment of Soviet naval forces in the 
North Atlantic. Experiences of the recent Middle East war demonstrate that hostilities 
could erupt too quickly to allow NATO recovery of its facilities there, they believe." 
(AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY December 17, 1973) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
"Navy will spend $35 million from Fiscal 1974 funds to prepare Cape Canaveral, Fla., to 
handle Trident submarines and the Lockheed Trident C-4 missile. Dredging and wharf 
facilities will be funded for the boats, and modifications will be made to the guidance and 
telemetry building at the Kennedy Space Center for flight testing the missile." 
(AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY December 31, 1973) 
